




Policy makers and market participants alike wish to understand
the amount, economic signiﬁcance, and concentration of derivatives
trading activity. This paper suggests that systematic measuring and
reporting of margin by market participants, disaggregated by asset
class, would provide more meaningful insights into derivatives activity.
Where margin is not required, it could nevertheless be imputed and re-
ported. The Dodd-Frank ﬁnancial reform bill, by contrast, moves away
from transparency by granting non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms an end-user exemp-
tion from posting initial margin on their trades. This is economically
equivalent to a borrowing from the counterparty and eﬀectively per-
mits these ﬁrms to issue oﬀ-balance-sheet debt.
1 Introduction
In discussions related to derivatives and regulatory policy, three questions
often arise:
• How great is the exposure to derivatives in the aggregate?
• How is this exposure split across diﬀerent asset classes?
• How sensitive is the magnitude of exposure to economic shocks?
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1Margin—collateral that protects the counterparty against losses from fail-
ure to pay—is an economic measure of exposure that diﬀers by asset and
by the topology of risk. In this paper I discuss the idea that reporting of
margin, disaggregated by product class and by entity, would provide a stan-
dardized measure of the speciﬁc net risks being borne with derivatives, and
provide information about entity vulnerabilities to speciﬁc market shocks,
along with sector concentrations in particular derivative asset classes.1 The
future conﬁguration of contracts, institutions, trading, and market prac-
tices is diﬃcult to forecast. As markets evolve, routine margin reporting
would provide information about risks potentially helpful to policy makers,
analysts, and market participants.
The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) estimates that at year-end
2010, the outstanding notional amount of over-the-counter (OTC) deriva-
tives was $601 trillion (BIS, 2011). According to the BIS, the vast majority
(77%) of these contracts are interest rate derivatives (with over 10% of this
amount as options), with foreign exchange derivatives second at 9.6% and
credit default swaps (CDS) third at about 5%. Equity contracts represent
about 1% and commodity contracts about 0.5%. The BIS obtained this esti-
mate by surveying market participants and eliminating the double-counting
that results from both A and B reporting the same derivative contract be-
tween A and B.
The BIS estimate is diﬃcult to interpret for several reasons.2 First,
by deﬁnition the count includes positions that are eﬀectively oﬀsets. For
example, if two dealers in the ordinary course of business enter into a series of
1Acharya (2011) suggests even more detailed reporting on derivatives. Whereas I em-
phasize reporting of existing margins, Acharya (2011) emphasizes reporting of what he
calls “potential exposure”, including additional margin calls due to credit downgrades.
2ISDA (2011) makes two additional adjustments to the BIS number. First, it elimi-
nates foreign exchange swaps. Second, it reduces the BIS estimate for double-counting of
interest rate swaps cleared at LCH Clearnet. Regarding the treatment of foreign exchange
swaps, ISDA subtracts the value of FX swaps on the grounds that these are short-term
and, bizarrely, that they are “older products”. Duﬃe (2011), in a comment on the Trea-
sury proposal to exempt FX swaps from clearing requirements, expresses skepticism that
foreign exchange swaps should be treated diﬀerently than other derivatives. Regarding the
treatment of cleared swaps, the adjustment for double-counting arises from the observa-
tion that a single swap presented to a clearing house becomes two swaps, one each between
the original counterparties and the clearinghouse. Clearing therefore leads to an increase
in the measured notional value of swaps. This is correct, but it is also true that the use
of a clearinghouse does create new counterparty relationships for a given contract. Both
the FX and clearing adjustments illustrate the limited usefulness of aggregate numbers.
Disaggregated statistics permit the statistical consumer to make whatever adjustments
seem appropriate for the analysis at hand.
2non-identical but functionally similar swaps, there are likely to be signiﬁcant
economic oﬀsets, so that the net exposure of one dealer in the event of
bankruptcy by the other dealer is small. How overstated is the notional
amount reported by BIS?
Second, the number includes derivatives based on interest rates, equity,
credit, foreign exchange, and commodities. A swap of a given notional
amount will embody diﬀerent risks depending on the underlying asset, ma-
turity, and structure of the product. A $1 million vanilla equity swap will
typically be riskier than a $1 million vanilla interest rate swap. However,
swaps, including interest rate swaps, can be designed to have additional lay-
ers of leverage and thus be substantially riskier than vanilla swaps per dollar
of notional value. A famous example of this is the Procter and Gamble swap
(McDonald, 2006, p. 264).
In Section 2 I discuss the economic interpretation of margin for indi-
vidual contracts and for portfolios of contracts. I present examples showing
how margin is assessed in practice for diﬀerent kinds of underlying assets. In
Section 3, I discuss discuss diﬀerent margin practices in centrally cleared and
OTC markets. Depending upon whether the margining system is gross or
net, margin may be held by diﬀerent parties. Section 4 presents several ex-
amples illustrating diﬀerent margin calculations for cleared and non-cleared
transactions. Using these examples, I contrast margin with notional amount
and VaR as measures of risk. In Section 5 discuss a controversial feature of
Dodd-Frank, the end-user examption. I show that this feature can be seen
as creating implicit oﬀ-balance sheet borrowing by the exempt end-user.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Understanding Margin
Derivatives contracts have future settlement based on a reference price, but
it is common to settle the contracts on an ongoing mark-to-market basis as
prices change prior to contract maturity. The term “margin” encompasses
at least two diﬀerent kinds of payments related to this settlement in ad-
vance: the maintenance margin, which is referred to in the OTC market as
the “independent amount,” and the variation margin.3 The maintenance
margin, which is the focus of this paper, is an amount that provides collat-
3The CME also distinguishes between initial margin and maintenance margin. Initial
margin is the amount a trader must provide at the initiation of a position, while mainte-
nance margin is the amount below which the trader must provide additional margin. We
will focus on maintenance margin in this discussion.
3eral against possible future loss before the next marking to market of the
contract. Depending upon the context, market participants under current
rules may or may not post maintenance margin. The variation margin, by
contrast, is a payment that covers realized loss, thereby resetting the value
of the derivative to zero, and preventing losses from cumulating.
Margin is collateral for a contractual obligation and as such reﬂects the
riskiness of the contract. Although the notional amount of a position can be
diﬃcult to interpret, the margin on a position is an economically meaningful
value, routinely computed and used by market participants as a protection
against counterparty default. Margin thus provides a common denominator
with which to compare the risk of diﬀerent contracts and positions. In this
section I provide some examples to illustrate margin practices in several
diﬀerent contexts.
Throughout this discussion we will be assuming that the derivative con-
tract under discussion resembles a futures contract or swap, in that it has
no initial premium (i.e., no payment from one party to the other, distinct
from margin), there is futurity, i.e. the contract will require future perfor-
mance, and at the future settlement date there is a possibility of payments
from either one of the two parties to the other. Credit risk is therefore
two-sided. Contracts for which the buyer fully pays (such as options) are
diﬀerent because the buyer has no further obligation, and thus credit-risk is
one-sided.
2.1 Margin in Theory
Assume that there are two ﬁrms, A and B, that enter into a derivative
contract such as a vanilla swap. A ﬁrm posts margin to protect the coun-
terparty against the failure of the other to make a required payment on
the derivative. In pratice margin is often computed as the expected loss on
the position that occurs with some probability. The amount of margin will
depend upon the frequency with which the position value is measured and
settled.
Various methods can be used to compute the margin amount, but it is
helpful to think of margin as a tail VaR, which is the conditional expectation
of a position value if it falls below a certain level. Let Vt be the value of the
derivative for A, so that −Vt is the value for B. Assuming that A is long, so









where Vt is the value of the derivative position at time t (it can be positive
4or negative), V
p
t+1 is the value of the claim such that
Pr(Vt+1 < V
p
t+1 |Vt) = p
that occurs with (or is exceeded with) probability p, and Mt is margin at
time t. For example, margin might be computed based on a value that is
exceeded with 1% probability. Note that there is a time period implicit in
the calculation of MA
t . For exchanges, the time period is typically a day.
In OTC markets, the time period can be several days, in which case margin
will be correspondingly greater, other things equal.














t+1 |Vt) = p
In practice, for futures traded at exchanges, margin is set symmetrically so
that MA
t = MB
t . Symmetry is not necessary, however. For options, margin
applies only to levered or written positions. Equations (1) and (2) provide a
rough conceptual description of the margin calculations of many derivatives
clearinghouses.
Equations (1) and (2) are statistical deﬁnitions of margin. These mea-
sures are not based on an economic theory of optimal margin, which would
require modeling default and systemic risk.4 The margin calculations also
make no adjustment for the risk of the speciﬁc counterparty. Nevertheless,
MA
t and MB
t correspond conceptually to clearinghouse practice.
In this discussion we have not speciﬁed the time horizon over which
marking to market occurs. In practice, clearinghouses compute margin with
respect to daily price moves. In the OTC market, revaluations may occur
only weekly, in which case margins are larger due to less frequent marking-to-
market. Margin is often approximated as a multiple of the asset standard
deviation. A weekly return standard deviation will be approximately
√
5
times the daily standard deviation. If margin were being used to compare
exposures across classes of derivatives, it would be neccesary to know the
mark-to-market horizon in order to infer the underlying positions.
4Bolton and Oehmke (2011) develop a model of optimal derivatives use and collateral
in a context where hedging has value for ﬁrms but entails real costs, and there is credit
risk.
52.2 Netting and Portfolio Margining
The preceding discussion deﬁned margin for a single asset. For a portfolio
of assets, margin can be computed in the same way. Suppose there are
two derivatives with values Vt and Qt held in quantities αv and αq. Let
Wt = αvVt +αqQt denote the value of the portfolio. (Buyers and sellers can










where Mt(W) denotes the margin for asset W. By the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality,
αvMt(V ) + αqMt(Q) ≥ Mt(W) (4)
Setting margin for the position W using equation (3) is called portfolio
margining, with the margin based on the aggregate risk of the portfolio
components rather than the individual risks.5
The calculation in equation (4) depends upon the return correlations of
V and Q. Correlations may vary over time and increase across asset classes
in times of stress. As a result, portfolio margining is generally used only
within speciﬁc asset classes, where correlations are likely to be high and
relatively stable.
2.3 Margin Examples
The economic risk, and thus the margin, associated with a given notional
amount diﬀers by asset class and other characteristics, including maturity
and the structure of the contract. In the following we use CME Group
margin levels to illustrate possible diﬀerences in margin amount for a $100
million notional position in diﬀerent assets.
5Suppose that V and Q are marked to market over diﬀerent horizons, which we will
call one period and T periods. To understand portfolio margining in this case, let σV
and σQ represent the two one-period standard deviations (corresponding to the more
frequent mark-to-market interval) and ρ the return correlation. Suppose that Q is marked












T. The horizon T does not aﬀect the variance of V
in this calculation because the position is refreshed every period and there is never more















As T increases, margin increases due to the risk of Q.
6Consider a contract to hedge a future $100 million 90-day loan with a
rate that will be linked to LIBOR on the lending date. One way to hedge this
loan is by entering into a Eurodollar futures contract, which is an exchange
traded contract. The notional value of the contract is $1 million, so hedging
the loan requires a position in 100 contracts.6
For each exchange-traded contract, the CME Group web site reports the
intial margin — the amount that must be posted to enter into an outright po-
sition (long or short) in one contract — and the maintenance margin, which
is the minimum amount permitted in the margin account. Exchange-traded
contracts are marked-to-market daily. In June, 2011, the CME Group web-
site reported that initial margin and maintenance margin for the Eurodollar
contract was $608/$450 for contracts with an expiration date of less than
one year, $743/$550 for contracts with an expiration date between one and
three years, and $1013/$750 for longer-dated contracts. In all three cases
the maintenance margin is 74% of the initial margin, which in turn is less
than 0.1% of the notional amount of $1 million. For our purposes, mainte-
nance margin is the required minimum and thus corresponds most closely
to equations (1) and (2).
Thus, hedging the $100 million loan would require that traders on each
side of the contract maintain a margin balance of between $45,000 and
$75,000, depending on the maturity of the contracts. In this example, we
would observe open interest of 100 contracts and, because there is both a
long and a short, total margin of roughly $90,000 to $150,000, depending
upon maturity.
There are trading strategies such as spreads that would result in dif-
ferent margin amounts. For example, consider a trader who goes long 50
Eurodollar contracts expiring in one month and short 50 Eurodollar con-
tracts expiring in a later month. The risk of a spread is lower than the risk
of an outright position, so the spread — which also generates open inter-
est of 100 contracts — would require initial margin of between $23,600 and
$57,400, depending on maturity. This is about half the margin for a 100
contract outright position.
Some trading strategies require substantially smaller margin amounts
per contract. For example, going long one December 2012 contract, long
three June 2013 contracts, short three March 2013 contracts, and short one
September 2013 contract—a so-called “condor”—would have initial margin
6In this example it is irrelevant whether the party is hedging a lending or borrowing
position. However, hedging a loan would entail going long Eurodollar futures, which are
designed to behave like a bond, making money when the interest rate goes down. A short
position would hedge borrowing.
7Asset Ticker Number Margins
of contracts Outright Spread
Eurodollar ED 100 $45,000 $20,000
Treasury Bond US 1000 $2,000,000 $300,000
S&P 500 Index SP 320 $6,400,000 $80,000
Crude Oil (WTI) CL 1000 $5,250,000 $300,000
Natural Gas (Henry Hub) NG 2174 $4,347,826 $869,565
Gold GC 667 $3,000,000 $54,667
Copper HG 1000 $4,250,000 $225,000
Corn C 3077 $5,384,615 $2,307,692
Table 1: Maintenance margin for diﬀerent representative futures at CME
Group exchanges, assuming a $100 million notional amount in the case of
outright trades, and a $100 million notional amount on each side in the
case of spread trades (this is twice the number of contracts). The “Number
of Contracts” column reports the number of contracts with a $100 million
notional amount. Source: CMEGroup.com
of $68. If a trader entered into 12 such positions, there would be open
interest of 96 contracts and total margin of $816. Depending on the spread
strategy, required margin can vary by a factor of 10.
2.4 Margin for Diﬀerent Assets
Table 1 shows representative margin levels for positions with a notional value
of $100,000,000 for diﬀerent contracts.7 The main point of Table 1 is that
for a given notional amount, the risk of a position, as measured by margin,
can vary signiﬁcantly.8 Even ignoring the Eurodollar contract, margin can
vary by a factor of three (T-bonds vs the S&P 500 index), and margin on
7Table 1 is intended only to be illustrative, but it is worth noting that there can be a
great deal of contract-to-contract variation in margin characteristics even holding ﬁxed the
underlying asset or commodity. The Table emphasizes diﬀerences across assets, but the
diﬀerences in margin for a given asset, across diﬀerent expirations, can also be considerable.
For example, crude oil maintenance margins on outright positions start at $6,250 for the
near months, and decline to $5,000 for contracts more distant than 20 months. Corn
spread margins are $750/contract for spreads that cross harvests (for example summer
against winter months), and $300/contract for spreads in the same season. The examples
in Table 1 are necessarily somewhat arbitrary.
8The Eurodollar contract has a deceptively low margin. A common use of the contract
is the hedging of swaps. The equivalent of a 10-year swap would be a set of eurodollar
contracts with 40 diﬀerent maturities. Multiplying the Eurodollar margin by 40 yields a
margin of $1.8 million, close to that of Treasury bonds.
8spread positions can vary still more widely. For some assets, spreads are low
risk (the S&P 500 index and gold, for example), while for others, spreads
are relatively risky (corn and natural gas).
3 Margin in Practice
In this section I discuss how margin is handled at a central clearinghouse
and in the OTC market. It is important to keep in mind that all derivatives
are in zero net supply. Also, for futures and swaps with zero value, both the
buyer and seller post margin because either could experience a loss.
3.1 Clearinghouse Margin Practice
A typical clearinghouse becomes the counterparty for all traders: the seller
to all buyers and the buyer to all sellers. This process by which the clearing-
house substitutes itself as counterparty is called novation. A clearinghouse
does not novate all counterparty relationships, but typically deals directly
only with clearing members, who in turn have obligations to the clearing-
house.9 Other traders interact with the clearinghouse through clearing mem-
bers.
A clearinghouse will have procedures and safeguards to protect clearing
members against default by other clearing members. One common practice
is for the clearinghouse to hold margin. For example, the CME Group in
2010 (CME Group Inc., 2010) reported holding $82 billion of performance
bonds. Depending upon the requirements of the clearinghouse and regula-
tors, this reported margin number can have diﬀerent interpretations. The
following discussion is intended to outline the possibile practices concerning
margin, rather than the speciﬁc practices of any particular exchange.
3.1.1 Outright Positions
Consider the left-hand side of Figure 1, in which there are two clearing
members, and Clearing Member 1 has two customer accounts. Suppose
that Customer A is long two contracts, Customer B is short one contract,
and Clearing Member 2 is short one contract. Margin is M per contract,
so total margin deposited by customers at Clearing Member 1 is 3M, and
Clearing Member 2 must deposit M. The disposition of the margin depends
9Clearing members will contribute to a clearinghouse guarantee fund, must be in ﬁnan-
cial good standing, and may have an obligation to contribute further to the clearinghouse
in the event another clearing member defaults.
9on clearinghouse rules, but the important point is that the total margin of
4M on deposit from customers measures their one-period economic exposure
resulting from their derivatives positions.10
What happens to the 4M on deposit? The clearinghouse could mandate
that Clearing Member 1 post with the clearinghouse all margin received,
in which case the clearinghouse would show performance bond holdings of
4M. This treatment of margin by the clearinghouse is referred to as gross
margining. Alternatively, rules could be such that the clearinghouse would,
in the event of a failure, have a net obligation of one contract to Clearing
Member 1, and the clearinghouse could then require a deposit only of M,
the margin on one contract, with Clearing Member 1 continuing to hold the
remaining 2M. This is a net margining system.
Thus, depending upon its rules, the clearinghouse could hold two units
of margin, four units of margin, or something in between. In a net margin
system, Clearing Member 1 would hold the two units of margin that are
not held by the clearinghouse. The speciﬁc rights and obligations of cus-
tomers, clearing members, and the clearinghouse under the two systems are
potentially quite complicated and are beyond the scope of this discussion.
The point is that the margin held by the clearinghouse provides diﬀerent
measures under the two systems, even when there is only contract.
3.1.2 Cross-margined Positions
As discussed above, margin can be based on a total portfolio position, taking
into account diversiﬁcation. Clearinghouses routinely use portfolio margin-
ing for calendar spreads (e.g., long September and short October in the
same asset or commodity) and spread positions in diﬀerent equity indexes
(e.g. long Dow-Jones and short the S&P 500). Going long and short the
same contract is a limiting case of portfolio margining (the two positions are
perfectly negatively correlated). Portfolio margining is generally not used
across asset classes.
Once margin is computed for a position, margin can be held by the broker
or clearinghouse depending upon whether there is gross or net margining.
10Note that there are credit relationships in the clearinghouse model that do not involve
payment of margin. Generally, Clearing Member 1, not the clearinghouse, is the counter-
party for Customers A and B. If Clearing Member 1 were to fail, the clearinghouse would
protect other clearing members against losses, but customers of Clearing Member 1 could









Figure 1: Derivatives counterparties with and without a clearinghouse.
3.2 OTC Margin Practice
Under Dodd Frank, margin treatment in the OTC market should closely
resemble that for clearinghouses, with the dealer bank serving as the clearing
entity. Prior to Dodd-Frank, however, margin practice in the OTC market
typically diﬀered from that in clearinghouses.11
The OTC market is illustrated on the right hand side of Figure 1. Sup-
pose that Customers C and D enter into oﬀsetting positions in an OTC
version of the same contract that A and B are holding. The OTC Dealer is
counterparty to each, eﬀectively serving the same role as the clearinghouse.
The customers are exposed to the dealer, and the dealer is exposed to each
customer. Prior to Dodd-Frank, it would have been possible that none
of the participants in Figure 1 would have posted maintenance margin.12
Typically, the dealer would compute the independent amount (analogous to
maintenance margin) for a counterparty and then the party with the larger
independent amount (typically the customer) would post collateral equal to
11OTC margining is discussed in detail in Appendix A of Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009). One issue pertaining to OTC margining that I do not address is the eﬀect of
non-standardized contracts and illiquid markets for the underlying asset.
12Under proposed rules, The SEC and CFTC would designate large dealer ﬁrms as
“covered swap entities.” These ﬁrms would be required to collect margin from one another.
11the diﬀerence in the independent amounts. This is in contrast with the sit-
uation at a clearinghouse, where the two clearing members would both post
margin for their positions. Another diﬀerence is that OTC margin calcula-
tions for diﬀerent asset classes may cover diﬀerent horizons: several days,
for example, rather than one day.
As with a clearinghouse, OTC dealers make use of portfolio margining
but only for closely-related assets.
4 Using Margin to Assess Risk
Margin requirements attempt to measure risk in a precise way, so system-
atic reporting of margin, broken down by asset class, reported by market
participants, would provide potentially valuable information to regulators,
analysts, and other market participants. One could imagine a reporting
scheme in which derivatives would be broken out into standard asset class
categories, for example: equity, index, ﬁxed income, energy, agricultural
commodities, metals, and foreign exchange. Derivative margin by such cat-
egories would be reported by clearinghouses, swap clearing entities, dealers,
and corporate end-users.
Major market participants such as clearinghouses and swap clearing en-
tities could report margin broken down by asset class, with and without
incorporating the eﬀects of cross-margining. This number could be divided
by two in order to compare directly to open interest.
• Clearinghouse rules might leave substantial customer margin held by
clearing members (for example, if the clearinghouse uses net margin-
ing). In this case, the margin in the custody of clearing members could
be reported as well.
• Covered swap entities could report margin, by asset class, for non-
cleared swaps.
• For users subject to the end-user exemption, margin that would have
been otherwise required would be reported by asset class
To illustrate the role of margin in measuring economic exposure, Table
2 summarizes a series of transactions undertaken by diﬀerent entities. The
discussion in this section will be based upon the amounts in Table 1. The
transactions illustrate three issues in assessing derivatives risk:
1. The existence of partial oﬀsetting positions between two counterparties
(transactions 1 and 2, group A)
12Outright
Group Item Description Long Short Margin
A 1 $125 1.25-year swap D1 D2 $6.25
2 $150 1.5-year swap D2 D1 $7.50
B 3 $100 1-year swap D3 D4 $5.00
4 $100 1-year swap D4 D5 $5.00
5 $100 1-year swap D5 D3 $5.00
C 6 $100 1-year exotic levered
swap
C D6 $20.00
7 $100 1-year swap D6 C $5.00
Table 2: Hypothetical oil derivatives positions among six dealers (D1 – D6)
and one customer (C). All swaps are based on 83,333 barrels/month and
outright margin is assumed to be 5% of notional for standard swaps. All
dollar amounts are millions.
2. Cyclical transactions, where individual ﬁrms face exposure that could
be netted, but is not (transactions 3, 4, and 5, group B)
3. Non-standard derivatives (transactions 6 and 7, group C)
Note that none of the positions in Table 2 are exactly oﬀsetting both with
respect to both the contract and the counterparty. The notional amounts for
oil swaps in the table are based upon a price of $100/barrel and settlement
based on 83,333 barrels/month. The stated notional amount is the total
barrels over the life of the swap times price. We assume that the margin is
$5/barrel or $5 million on a $100 million swap and $20 million for the exotic
swap. The measured total notional derivatives positions implied by Table
2, as well as the amount and location of risk exposures, will depend upon
whether the trades are cleared.
4.1 Clearinghouse Treatment
Suppose ﬁrst that trades are centrally cleared. Table 2 illustrates the original
trades, but assume that the ordinary swaps have been presented to the
clearinghouse and novated. For the purpose of this discussion it does not
matter whether the dealers are clearing members.
In transactions 1 and 2, D1 and D2 have partially oﬀsetting positions in
swaps. Because each party is both long and short closely related contracts,
margin on the net position is that of a spread, reﬂecting the remaining
13exposure in months 16 through 18. The margin in this example would be
about $1.25 million for each counterparty.13
Transactions 3-5 illustrate the netting function of a clearinghouse. Each
dealer is both long and short the same contract, albeit with a diﬀerent coun-
terparty. Novation of the contracts makes the clearinghouse a counterparty
to all three contracts, eliminating the positions and therefore the exposure
of the dealers.
Finally, transactions 6 and 7 again represent partial oﬀsets for the cus-
tomer, who is long oil via an exotic swap and short oil with an ordinary swap,
with Dealer 1. Assuming the exotic swap cannot be cleared, the customer
owes $5 million margin to the clearinghouse for the ordinary swap and $20
million margin to the dealer for the exotic swap. The ordinary swap is no-
vated, resulting in the dealer and customer both having a standard cleared
contract.
Summarizing, with a clearinghouse, the transactions in Table 2 would
result in reported notional amounts of $475 million (transactions 3-5 vanish
due to novation) and margins of $1.25 million for Transactions 1 and 2
(counting one ﬁrm’s margin) and $25 million for Transactions 6 and 7.
Margins thus reveal low risk associated with the $275 million notional
amount of transactions 1 and 2, and the very high risk associated with the
$200 million notional of transactions 6 and 7. Transactions 3-5 do not exist.
4.2 OTC Treatment
Suppose now that all of the transactions in Table 2 are OTC, and therefore
not centrally cleared.14 Both open interest and margins are diﬀerent due to
diﬀerences in netting with and without central clearing.
Transactions 1 and 2 should result in the same margin as with central
clearing. As the counterparties are the same, only net exposure matters and
both sides are margined.
Transactions 3 to 5 are treated quite diﬀerently with and without central
clearing. In the OTC market there is no novation; all bilateral transactions
remin in place with the original counterparties. Therefore, the transactions,
13Margin in this case would reﬂect the diﬀerent notional amounts and also the diﬀerent
maturities. Presumably there would be a positive but small margin for equal notional
amounts in the two contracts, and an additional margin for the residual $25 million,
whence the assertion that margin would be “about” $1.25 million.
14The examples here would also apply if there were multiple clearinghouses for the same
product. The examples illustrate the incentive to consolidate trades in an asset class at a
single clearinghouse.
14which net to zero with central clearing, will remain outstanding. This in-
creases total notional amounts by $300 million. Further, under Dodd-Frank,
all dealers will post margin with their counterparties. (This creates a pow-
erful incentive to identify and unwind such transactions, achieving the same
outcome as novation.)
Finally, with the standard swap receiving OTC treatment, it is possible
for dealer 1 and the customer to net the exotic and ordinary swap, transac-
tions 6 and 7. The same notional amounts would be outstanding for these
transactions but the amount of margin is reduced from $25 million when
cleared to $15 million when the exotic and ordinary swaps are not cleared.
Without clearing, notional amounts outstanding increase to $775 million
and required margins increase by approximately $5 million. This takes ac-
count of the increase of $15 million from transactions 3-5 and the reduction of
$10 million from transactions 6 and 7. The increase in OTC margin relative
to clearinghouse margin in this example reﬂects the increase in counterparty
credit risk from the inability to novate in an OTC setting.
4.3 Discussion
The examples illustrate how margin measures the net exposure to a given
counterparty, providing a convenient and consistent measure of exposure to a
given asset class. The aggregate notional amount of derivatives outstanding
is quite diﬀerent in the cleared and uncleared case, but margin is almost
the same. The examples illustrate one case where margin is the same in
a cleared and non-cleared system (transactions 1 and 2), one case where
margin and risk are both reduced in the cleared system (transactions 3-5),
albeit because derivatives positions are eliminated by clearing; and one case
where margin declines in the uncleared system (transactions 6 and 7). In
each case, margin shows who is bearing risk and how it is distributed.
Note that it would be diﬃcult to obtain this risk exposure information in
other ways. One possibility would be to acquire precise information about
the terms and counterparties of derivatives claims outstanding, but assess-
ing risk would require valuing these claims and computing net exposure to
each counterparty. With margin, the counterparties have performed this
calculation. The requirement of consistent margin reporting is thus a de-
centralized form of regulation: margin is computed by agents with economic
stakes, rather than by a central entity.
In addition to margin, there at least two other leading natural mea-
sures of derivatives usage and exposure applicable both to OTC and cleared
positions.
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standing, with no adjustment for risk or oﬀsetting positions. In table
2, notional amounts with clearing are $475 and without clearing $775,
but aggregate margin is almost the same. As discussed in the intro-
duction, notional amount takes no account of the diﬀerent risks of
positions or whether there are oﬀsetting positions. It is inherently
diﬃcult to interpret the economic signiﬁcance of notional amounts.
• Value at Risk (VaR). VaR measures the ﬁrm’s speciﬁc exposure. As
discussed in Section 2, margin is conceptually similar to value at risk.
The diﬀerence is that value at risk may be zero in circumstances where
margin would be positive. For example, in Group B without clearing,
each of the three ﬁrms would show zero VaR, whereas under the rules
proposed by Dodd-Frank, each would post margin for both positions.
The positive margin amount would indicate that there is a chain of
uncleared obligations, which is indicative of systemic risk.
The implementation questions for a margin reporting system include the
following:
• How ﬁnely should asset classes be subdivided? It is common to sub-
divide products as equity, interest rates, credit, foreign exchange, and
commodities. Finer subdivisions would include splitting equity and
interest rates by currency of denomination, and commodities into agri-
culture, energy, and metals.
• How ﬁne-grained should entity-level reporting be? Two objections to
ﬁne-grained reporting by dealer banks would be the costs of reporting
and the possibility of releasing proprietary information. Presumably
regulators will be receiving detailed information, so the issue of cost
should be moot. The issue of proprietary information is potentially
more problematic.
• How frequent should reporting be? Under Dodd-Frank, OTC deriva-
tives trades are to be publicly reported on a near real-time basis, and
dealers presumably will be performing margin calculations at least
daily. Daily or weekly margin reporting should be feasible.
• Does portfolio margining raise special issues? If portfolio margins were
sensitive to correlation assumptions, margins could change abruptly
at the onset of a crisis. One could require reporting of margins with
and without portfolio margining. This is probably not important with
16current practice, but could be a signiﬁcant issue if the scope of portfolio
margining were to increase.
5 The End-User Exemption
The exception to the requirement to post margin under Dodd-Frank is the
proposed “end-user exemption” for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, under
the Treasury’s proposed margin and capital requirements for covered swap
entities (Department of the Treasury et al, 2011),
...a covered swap entity would not be required to collect
initial or variation margin from a nonﬁnancial end user counter-
party as long as the cover swap entity’s exposures to the nonﬁ-
nancial end-user were below the credit exposure limits that the
covered swap entity has established ...(p. 25)
Note that under this proposed rule, because the trigger is credit exposure
to the dealer, an exempt end-user could avoid posting margin by splitting
positions among multiple dealers.
The end-user exemption has been controversial because it exempts a
large class of traders from the requirement to post explicit margin. Large
end-users lobbied for the exemption on the grounds that their hedging
transacations are implicitly oﬀsetting risk on non-ﬁnancial assets and the
margin requirement would make such transactions more costly. Neverthe-
less, large derivative positions would expose counterparties to credit risk.
Large ﬁrms would take derivatives positions correlated with their business,
so failure of the end-user would be correlated with failure to pay on the
contract. If failure occurs due to losses in the line of business associated
with the hedged asset, this correlation would be negative. But if failure oc-
cured due to systemic stresses, it is possible that failure of the business and
failure to pay on the contract could occur simultaneously. In any event, the
end-user exemption creates the economic equivalent of an oﬀ-balance-sheet
transaction between the dealer and end-user. The exemption also creates an
incentive for end-users to use non-cleared non-standard contracts in order
to obtain the exemption.
Suppose an end-user enters into an exchange-traded contract. The re-
sulting hypothetical balance sheet, including margin and ﬁnancing, is de-
picted in Figure 5. Margin posted by the end-user, ME, is assumed to be
debt-ﬁnanced. This captures the idea that a failure to pay variation margin
triggers default. For example, suppose the ﬁrm has A of assets and ﬁnanc-
ing, and posts margin of ME. If the ﬁrm suﬀers a loss on the position of
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Assets Liabilities
Risky asset A Financing A
Derivative 0 — —
Cash (Margin) ME Debt ME
Figure 2: Hypothetical balance sheets for a ﬁrm transacting in a derivatives
contract via a clearinghouse, and posting margin for derivatives transaction
that has a zero initial value. Firm has pre-existing assets and ﬁnancing of
A. Assumes that margin is debt-ﬁnanced.
End-user
Assets Liabilities
Risky asset A Financing A
Derivative 0 — —
Cash (Margin) ME Debt (3rd party) ME
Dealer Margin MD Exposure to Dealer MD
Dealer
Assets Liabilities
— — Derivative 0
Cash (Margin) MD Debt (3rd party) MD
End-user Margin ME Exposure to end-user ME
Figure 3: Hypothetical balance sheets for a ﬁrm and dealer transacting in
an OTC derivatives contract, with both posting margin for a derivatives
transaction that has a zero initial value. Assumes that margin is debt-
ﬁnanced.
λME, it is obligated to pay that amount, or else it is in default. Entering
into a derivative is analogous to a ﬁrm issuing short-term debt of ME and
investing the proceeds in a risky asset. Any failure to pay the loan due to a
loss on the invested value would trigger default.
Figure 3 generalizes Figure 5 to the case where there is an OTC contract
and both the ﬁrm and dealer post margin. Both issue debt to ﬁnance margin.
Each has an oﬀ-balance-sheet asset, margin posted by the other, to oﬀset
exposure to the other. The resulting conceptual balance sheet is in Figure
3.
Finally, consider the case whether neither ﬁrm posts margin. Each has
credit exposure to the other and thus, implicitly, each has made a loan to the
other. The end-user exemption, by allowing ﬁrms to avoid posting margin,
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Assets Liabilities
Risky asset A Financing A
Derivative 0 — —
Margin ME Debt (from dealer) ME
Loan to dealer (Margin) MD Exposure to Dealer MD
Dealer
Assets Liabilities
— — Derivative 0
Margin MD Debt (from end-user) MD
Loan to end-user (margin) ME Exposure to end-user ME
Figure 4: Hypothetical balance sheets for a ﬁrm and dealer transacting in
an OTC derivatives contract, with neither posting margin for a derivatives
transaction. Implicitly, each lends to the other.
eﬀectively permits oﬀ-balance-sheet ﬁnancing of the margin amount.
The upshot is that the end-user exemption creates an obligation resem-
bling an oﬀ-balance-sheet loan that ﬁnances an implicit margin deposit.
Exempt ﬁrms could report the amount of margin they would have posted
in the absence of the exemption. This would permit consistent analysis of
entity exposures and aggregate measures of derivatives activity.
6 Conclusion
The Dodd-Frank act was intended to reduce systemic risks. A central goal
of the legislation was to increase clearing of derivatives transactions, but at
this point no one knows the consequences of new rules. In particular, we
don’t know
• How large clearinghouses will be
• How many clearinghouses there will be
• How international integration and resolution will function
• How empirically important the end-user exemption will be.
• How much market-making business will ﬂee traditionally-regulated en-
tities (e.g., banks subject to Basel III)
19Whatever the new conﬁguration of ﬁrms and markets, the push to central
clearing will likely create new systemically important clearinghouses or re-
lated ﬁnancial utilities, some of which will be too big or interconnected to
fail. A critical question is what information will be useful across diﬀerent
possible future conﬁgurations of activity.
Frequent, disaggregated, public reporting of margin provides a mecha-
nism that should help regulators and market participants assess the risk of
aggregate positions and the eﬀects of changes in the level of risk. It should
help to assess the risks borne by clearinghouses, dealers, and large mar-
ket participants. Such reporting would reveal which asset classes have the
greatest risk exposure and potentially, depending on the level of disaggre-
gation, which sectors have exposure to which risks (for example, insurance
companies writing credit default swaps).
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